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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DANIEL ALLEN BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 43262
Canyon County Case No.
CR-2012-10660

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Brown failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
relinquishing jurisdiction and executing his underlying unified sentence of five years,
with one and one-half years fixed, imposed upon his guilty plea to burglary?

Brown Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
Brown pled guilty to burglary and the district court imposed a suspended unified
sentence of five years, with one and one-half years fixed, and placed Brown on
probation for three years. (R., pp.36-38.)

Fifty-four days later, Brown incurred new
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criminal charges and was required to serve a total of 21 days of discretionary jail time.
(R., pp.39-40.)

Just over two months later, Brown was required to serve an additional

seven days of discretionary jail time for violating a No Contact Order. (R., p.41.) The
state subsequently filed a Petition for Probation Violation alleging Brown had violated
his probation by committing new crimes. (R., pp.42-53.) Brown admitted to violating his
probation and the district court revoked his probation and reinstated him on probation
for three years beginning May 20, 2013. (R., p.68.)
On December 31, 2013, Brown was required to serve seven days of
discretionary jail time for another No Contact Order violation, and for incurring the new
charge of driving without privileges. (R., p.69.) Less than seven months later, the state
filed a new Petition for Probation Violation alleging Brown had again violated his
probation. (R., pp.70-77.) Brown admitted to some of the allegations in the Petition,
and the district court again revoked and reinstated him on probation for 18 months
beginning on November 12, 2014. (R., p.93.)
On November 24, 2014, Brown was again ordered to serve seven days of
discretionary jail time, and the state filed a third Petition for Probation Violation on
December 2, 2014. (R., pp.94-99.) After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found
Brown in violation of his probation, revoked probation, ordered Brown’s underlying
sentence executed, and retained jurisdiction for 365 days. (R., pp.114-15.)
After a period of retained jurisdiction, the district court relinquished jurisdiction
without a hearing and ordered Brown’s sentence executed without reduction.
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(R.,

pp.116-17.)

Brown timely appealed and timely filed a Rule 35 motion for sentence

reduction, which the district court denied. (R., pp.118-26, 133-37. 1)
Brown asserts the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished
jurisdiction “[i]n light of his expressed desire to be successful and his positive actions on
the rider.” (Appellant’s brief, p.4.) The record supports the district court’s decision to
relinquish jurisdiction.
“Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.” I.C. § 19-2601(4).
The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial
court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. See
State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203,
205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990). A

court’s

decision

to

relinquish

jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial court has sufficient
information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be
inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521. State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583,
584 (Ct. App. 1984).
Contrary to Brown’s claim on appeal, Brown has not shown he is an appropriate
candidate for probation. While in the community, Brown repeatedly committed new
crimes and generally disregarded the directions of his probation officer and the terms of
his probation.

(R., pp.39-53, 69-77, 94-99.)

While on his Rider at NICI, Brown

repeatedly lied to staff; deliberately disobeyed the rules of his program; disobeyed direct
orders given to him by NICI staff; failed to complete any of his programming; and failed

1

Brown is not challenging the district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion on
appeal. (Appellant’s brief, p.3.)
3

to take responsibility for his underlying crime in this matter, stating he had only “taken
the fall for his wife.” (05/07/15 APSI, pp.1-4 (Augmentation).) In recommending the
district court relinquish jurisdiction, NICI staff stated:

Mr. Brown has failed to make responsible choices while at NICI. He
appears to be focused on criminal activities rather than changing his
thinking and behavior so that he can be successful on probation. In April,
he was asked how he believed he was doing, and he reported, “I honestly
think that I am off to a good start and am learning something every day.”
Either he was not being honest, which has been an ongoing issue with Mr.
Brown, or he is unaware of the reality of his situation. While at NICI, Mr.
Brown has continued to use the criminal and addictive patterns and
distortions that terminated his probation in the first place. Currently, he
appears deeply reliant on his ability to manipulate others in order to avoid
negative consequences. This is a maladaptive coping skill; however, he
does not appear motivated to change at this time. During his end-case
interview, Mr. Brown reported that he understood that his probation officer
was only trying to help him, yet he also blamed him when he reported that
he would be fine with a new probation officer. Currently, Mr. Brown is
either unwilling or unable to make the necessary changes in order to be
successful on probation and does not appear suitable for release to the
community at this time.
(05/07/15 APSI, p.6.) Brown has failed to demonstrate that he was a viable candidate
for community supervision, particularly in light of his abysmal performance both on
probation and during the short time he was in the retained jurisdiction program, and his
failure to demonstrate any rehabilitative progress. Given any reasonable view of the
facts, Brown has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
relinquishing jurisdiction.
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Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Brown’s conviction and
sentence.
DATED this 16th day of December, 2015.

/s/
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

CATHERINE MINYARD
Paralegal
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/s/
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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